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Laura Phelan began working as a mechanical assistant in the boiler room
of... Cook County Hospital ....
Phelan's co-workers.., began subjecting her to various abusive behaviors
immediately after she began working there. She was the target of sexually
offensive comments and solicitations, sexually offensive touching and
displays of pornography. On multiple occasions, Phelan's co-workers told
her that, in order to survive in the department, she would need to perform
sexual acts.
In July of 2000, Phelan did not report for work and called in sick...
[because of] distress over the treatment she had received from her co-
workers and the inadequate response from human resources and
management. She began seeing a psychiatrist, who diagnosed her as
suffering from major depression and post-traumatic stress disorder.'
L Introduction
Phelan later requested a medical absence, but Cook County denied her
request. 2 Because of her emotional suffering, Phelan could not return to work,
and the hospital subsequently fired her.3 Although she ultimately convinced
the hospital to reverse its termination decision,4 the district court held that her
employer's decision to reinstate her with back pay voided her Title VII claim
because the employer's remedial activities sufficiently made her whole.5
In 1964, Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 6 to eliminate
1. Phelan v. Cook County, 463 F.3d 773, 776-78 (7th Cir. 2006).
2. Id. at 778.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See Phelan v. Cook County, No. 01 C 3638, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21345, at *23
(N.D. IIl. Oct. 24, 2004) (rejecting Phelan's retaliation claim because she did not provide
evidence that she suffered an adverse employment action following the reinstatement with back
pay).
6. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as
amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000)) (enforcing the right to vote, prohibiting




discrimination in employment.7 Section 704 includes an anti-retaliation
provision: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment...
because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner
in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [the Civil Rights Act]." To
make a Title VII retaliation claim,9 a plaintiff must show that she engaged in a
statutorily protected expression, that she suffered a materially adverse action,
and that there is a causal relationship between the protected expression and the
adverse action. °
In June 2006, the Supreme Court decided Burlington Northern & Santa
Fe Railway Co. v. White,I I which resolved a circuit split and broadened the
definition of a "materially adverse action."'12 Later that year, the Seventh
Circuit decided a factually similar case, Phelan v. Cook County,13 involving the
7. See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Parsing the Meaning of"Adverse Employment Action"
in Title VIDisparate Treatment, Sexual Harassment, and Retaliation Claims: What ShouldBe
Actionable Wrongdoing?, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 623,630-31(2004) (citing Trans WorldAirlines,
Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 71 (1977), which said that the Civil Rights Act's purpose was to
do away with discrimination with respect to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2000).
9. Title VII encompasses both provisions against discriminatory employment actions,
found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, and retaliation, found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. This Note
questions whether an employer can nullify a lawsuit by reinstating an employee with back pay
before the employee files suit. In both types of Title VII actions-discriminatory and
retaliatory-where an employer reinstates an employee with back pay prior to a lawsuit, the
analysis will be similar. For ease of reading, however, this Note will focus solely on a plaintiff
who brings a retaliation claim. Therefore, unless otherwise stated, this Note will refer to Title
VII to mean the anti-retaliation provision and not the anti-discriminatory employment practices
provision.
10. See Eiland v. Trinity Hosp., 150 F.3d 747, 753 (7th Cir. 1998) (describing the
elements of a prima facie case for an employment retaliation claim); see also MICHAEL J.
ZIMMER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & REBECCA HANNER WHITE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 648 (6th ed. 2003) ("As for the prima facie case... three
elements [are] generally recognized: (1) plaintiff engaged in protected expression, (2) she
suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) there was a causal link between the former and
the latter.").
11. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2409 (2006)
(concluding that the term "materially adverse" in retaliation claims refers to actions and harms
both related and unrelated to the employment in which a reasonable employee or applicant
would be deterred from exercising a statutorily recognized right).
12. See id. (adopting the broader standard for materially adverse action, which holds that
retaliation is not confined to actions and harms related to employment or that occur at the
workplace, and retaliation constitutes actions by employers that would deter a reasonable
employee or applicant to exercise a protected right).
13. See Phelan v. Cook County, 463 F.3d 773, 778 (7th Cir. 2006) (concluding that the
plaintiff's termination constituted retaliation).
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reinstatement with back pay of a wrongly terminated plaintiff. 4 Both cases
involved alleged discriminatory retaliation. The employers in each case
suspended or terminated the employees following a discrimination complaint,
then later reinstated the employees with back pay.15 In Phelan, however, the
Seventh Circuit answered a question that Burlington Northern neglected to
address: "[W]hether the fact that [an employer] later reinstated [the plaintiff
employee] and awarded her back pay somehow negates her right to pursue her
Title VII claims."'16 Although the Phelan district court originally concluded
that the employee's reassignment and reinstatement from suspension with back
pay did not amount to adverse employment actions, 7 the Seventh Circuit
reversed and found an actionable claim.
18
In a litigious society, the answer to the Phelan issue-whether to preclude
a wrongly terminated' 9 employee who is later reinstated with back pay from
initiating a lawsuit against her employer-is of utmost importance. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alone filed over 75,000
discrimination charges against employers in 2005.20 One can see why an
employer might find the actions of the Burlington Northern and Phelan
employers attractive: Rather than adding fuel to the fire in a contentious
workplace, an employer first can remove the complaining employee. Following
removal, the employer may investigate the allegations and may reinstate the
complaining employee with back pay if the allegations turn out to be false.
And by first removing the complaining employee, the employer avoids a
potentially tension-filled work environment.
14. See id. at 776-78 (describing the facts of the case).
15. See Burlington N., 126 S. Ct. at 2409 (recounting the factual background of the case);
Phelan, 463 F.3d at 776-78 (discussing the facts of the case).
16. Phelan, 463 F.3d at 780. The court also phrased the question: "This case examines
whether a Title VII plaintiff who is wrongly terminated should be foreclosed from pursuing her
claims where her employer eventually reinstates her with back pay." Id. at 776.
17. See Phelan v. Cook County, No. 01 C 3638, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21345, at *12,
*23 (N.D. I11. Oct. 24, 2004) (finding that there was no adverse employment action because
Cook County took remedial actions by reinstating Phelan with back pay, that not every
unwelcome employment action is an adverse action, and that there was no retaliatory action
because there was no adverse employment action).
18. See Phelan, 463 F.3d at 776 (reversing the district court's grant of summaryjudgment
on all but one count).
19. This Note will use "terminated employee" and "suspended employee," or
"termination" and "suspension" interchangeably.
20. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, EEOC Enforcement Statistics and
Litigation, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/enforcement.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2007) (showing the




This Note examines: (1) whether a terminated employee who later is
reinstated with back pay has an actionable Title VII retaliation claim; and (2) if
such claim exists, what possible remedies exist at law or equity for the plaintiff.
The Note answers the first issue in the affirmative; reinstatement with back pay
does not preclude a wrongly terminated employee from initiating a cause of
action. Assuming the existence of a cognizable lawsuit, the Note then
concludes that the plaintiff may receive punitive, compensatory, and equitable
damages.
Part II.A demonstrates how a plaintiff can show the first and third
elements of a prima facie case despite an employer's attempt to self-remedy the
wrong. This portion of the Note examines the types of protected expression
under Title VII and the causal relationship between the protected expression
and adverse action. Part II.B applies the Burlington Northern standard for a
"materially adverse action" and argues that, regardless of a reinstatement with
back pay, the wrongly terminated plaintiff suffered an adverse action. Where
both Burlington Northern and Phelan merely suggest emotional harm as a
rationale for finding materially adverse action,1 this Note argues that there is
an injury to reputation following a suspension of any kind, as well as
professional development loss. The Note also addresses the public policy
reasons for allowing this type of plaintiff to have an actionable claim.
Finally, this Note asserts that the wrongly terminated plaintiff has
remedies both at law and equity. Part III addresses the missing pieces in
Burlington Northern and Phelan-should there be a remedy under this
situation given that the Supreme Court has stated that the primary objective of
Title VII "is not to provide redress but to avoid harm"?2 2 Assuming the answer
to the previous question is yes, Part III explores the possible remedies available
to the plaintiff.
I1. Prima Facie Title VII Retaliation Claim
In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show:
(1) she "engaged in a statutorily protected expression"; (2) she suffered a
materially adverse action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the
21. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405,2417 (2006) (noting
that the plaintiffs emotional harm makes the suspension, even when later reinstated with back
pay, an adverse action); Phelan v. Cook County, 463 F.3d 773, 781 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that
Phelan's four-month suspension was "certainly enough time [for her]... to be measurably
injured by the termination, both financially and emotionally, regardless of whether back pay was
later awarded").
22. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-06 (1998).
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protected activity and the adverse action.23 The difference in a retaliation claim
between a reinstated employee with back pay and an employee who has not
been reinstated lies predominantly in the second element of the prima facie
case-whether the plaintiff suffered a materially adverse action. The
defendant-employer, who prior to the lawsuit reinstates the employee with back
pay, argues that there is no materially adverse action because the employee has
not been economically harmed.24 This will not end the analysis, however, as
the plaintiff still must show the first and third components. Because the parties
typically do not hotly contest the first and third elements, this Note first will
briefly dispose of these factors before proceeding with the second element.
A. First and Third Elements
1. Engaging in a Statutorily Protected Expression
The first element of a Title VII retaliation claim requires proof that the
plaintiff engaged in a statutorily protected expression. Often, this element
refers to the plaintiff-employee's ability and right to complain or to file a
discrimination charge against his employer;26 but other activities also may
constitute a statutorily protected expression.27 Title VII provides: "It shall be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of
his employees or applicants for employment... because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,




23. See Eiland v. Trinity Hosp., 150 F.3d 747, 753 (7th Cir. 1998) (describing the prima
facie case for a retaliation claim).
24. See infra Part II.B (discussing the second element of a prima facie retaliation claim).
25. See Eiland, 150 F.3d at 753 (describing the prima facie case for an employment
retaliation claim).
26. See Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 223 (2d Cir. 2001)
(finding for the plaintiff on the first element because she filed a complaint with the EEOC under
the Americans with Disabilities Act).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2000) (protecting the right to charge, testify, assist, or
participate in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing for discrimination); Joan M. Savage,
Note, Adopting the EEOC Deterrence Approach to the Adverse Employment Action Prong in a
Prima Facie Casefor Title VllRetaliation, 46 B.C. L. REv. 215,222 (2004) ("The most typical
type of participation involves the plaintiff filing a discrimination charge against his or her
employer, but also includes other activities, such as providing testimony or assisting in an
investigation.").
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2000).
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A complaining party may make a formal discrimination charge against her
employer if the employer violates any portion of the title;29 discriminatory
charges may be based, among other things, on race, religion, sex, and national
origin.30 Also, an employee may informally testify or otherwise participate in a
discrimination charge against her employer.3' According to Section 706 of the
Civil Rights Act, after an employee engages in these statutorily protected
activities and the employer retaliates, an employee may take the appropriate
administrative steps with the EEOC.32
At this stage, the EEOC may take one of the following actions: file a civil
suit, issue a right-to-sue letter to the employee and have the employee initiate
the lawsuit, or issue a no-cause letter.33 If the EEOC finds reasonable cause of
the charge's validity, the EEOC may take appropriate enforcement action
against the employer.34 The EEOC may file a civil suit itself or give the
employee a private cause of action with a right-to-sue letter.35 Conversely, if
the EEOC does not find evidence of discriminatory practices, it will issue a no-
cause letter;36 however, the employee maintains a right to sue because she
exhausted her administrative remedies. 7 Similarly, even if the plaintiff has not
obtained the EEOC's right-to-sue letter, a court may nevertheless grant some
sort of preliminary relief pending the outcome of the EEOC proceeding.
38
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (discussing the ability of the EEOC to enforce employer
violations of the discriminatory and retaliation provisions found in Sections 703 and 704 of the
Civil Rights Act).
30. See id. § 2000e-2 (discussing the protected classes).
31. See id. § 2000e-3 (laying out the retaliation provision of Title VII); id. § 2000e-5
(granting an employee the right to file a charge through the EEOC for retaliatory actions).
32. Id. § 2000e-5.
33. Id.
34. See id. ("If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is
reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate
any such alleged unlawfhl employment practice by informal methods of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion.").
35. Id.
36. Id. ("If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is not reasonable
cause to believe that the charge is true, it shall dismiss the charge and promptly notify the
person claiming to be aggrieved and the respondent of its action.").
37. See Wu v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir. 1989) (noting the EEOC's
issuance of no-cause but a right-to-sue letter on the employee's retaliation claim); Rose v.
Intertech Group, Inc., No. 4:04CV0143 JLH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92397, at *4-5 (E.D. Ark.
Dec. 18, 2006) (noting that the EEOC dismissed the employee's discrimination and retaliation
charges with a no cause determination, but the employee then filed suit).
38. See, e.g., Aronberg v. Walters, 755 F.2d 1114, 1115-16 (4th Cir. 1985) (remanding to
the district court in order to decide whether to grant plaintiff's application for temporary
injunctive relief to preserve the status quo pending a resolution of the suit).
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Here, because an employee has a statutorily created right to charge, testify,
or assist in a discrimination claim against her employer, as long as the wrongly
terminated employee follows the procedure found in Section 706 of the Civil
Rights Act, a court will find that the employee has met the first element of the
anti-retaliation case.39 If the employee makes some formal complaint,
especially if she files a complaint directly with the EEOC, she has a stronger
chance of proving the first element;40 however, the anti-retaliation statute also
protects other less formal employee actions. 41 After the employee exhausts her
administrative remedies found in Section 706 with the EEOC, the employee
may proceed with a cause of action.42
Following the proof of the first element, the employee must show the rest
of the prima facie case. In addition to proving a statutorily protected
expression, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving a materially adverse action
and a causal connection between the expression and the adverse action.
Because the second element is the most controversial issue for a wrongly
terminated employee reinstated with back pay, this Note will first discuss the
third element in the following section before proceeding to the second element
in Part II.B.
2. Proving a Causal Relationship
The third component in an anti-retaliation claim requires a showing of a
causal relationship between the protected expression and the adverse action.43
In order to prove this element, the purported adverse action must result from the
plaintiff's exercise of her statutorily protected right to make a complaint. The
plaintiff can prove this element either through direct or circumstantial
evidence. 44 Because direct evidence is often unavailable, the Supreme Court
39. See Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 223 (2d Cir. 2001)
(noting that a plaintiff met the first element of the retaliation claim by establishing evidence that
she filed a complaint with the EEOC, as protected by the Americans with Disabilities Act).
40. See Savage, supra note 27, at 223 (calling the filing of a formal complaint
"unquestionably a protected activity").
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2000) (protecting an employee's right to make a
discrimination charge, or to assist, testify, and participate in a charge or investigation of
discrimination); Savage, supra note 27, at 222 (discussing the types of protected activities).
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (discussing the administrative and procedural steps required
before a lawsuit).
43. See Eiland v. Trinity Hosp., 150 F.3d 747, 753 (7th Cir. 1998) (describing the
elements of a prima facie case for retaliation).
44. See ZIMMER, SULLIVAN & WHITE, supra note 10, at 648 (noting that retaliation
discrimination cases also use the McDonnell Douglas test when there is no direct evidence).
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has noted that the plaintiff's burden of proving a causal connection is "not
onerous"-the plaintiff simply needs to show that the employer acted under
circumstances giving rise to an inference of retaliation. 45 "[T]he prima facie
case 'raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts,
if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of
impermissible factors."' 46 After the plaintiff demonstrates the inference of a
causal connection, the employer must provide a legitimate motive for
retaliation.47 The plaintiff may rebut this legitimate motive by showing that the
employer's alleged legitimate motive was pretext for retaliation.48 To show
causal connection, a plaintiff may, among other things, offer evidence that the
employer was unlikely to terminate her for the stated reasons, 49 that the
employer consistently discouraged the plaintiff from complaining,50 or that
temporal proximity existed.5'
Often, a plaintiff can present the inference of a causal relationship by
showing a close temporal proximity between the adverse action and the
exercise of the plaintiff s right under Title VII.52 If the employer takes action
soon after the plaintiff complains of some discriminatory act, there is a stronger
inference that the plaintiff's actions caused the employer to act against the
"This [McDonnell Douglas test] includes three stages: the plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case, the employer articulates a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, and the plaintiff rebuts
by proving pretext." Id.; see also Justin P. O'Brien, Note, Weighing Temporal Proximity in
Title VII Retaliation Claims, 43 B.C. L. REV. 741, 745-46 (2002) (discussing the methods in
which a plaintiff can prove a Title VII retaliation claim).
45. See Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981)
(explaining the burden shifting process of a prima facie retaliation case and the plaintiff's
burden of proof).
46. Id. at 254 (citations omitted).
47. See O'Brien, supra note 44, at 748 (discussing the process of showing retaliation).
48. See Godoy v. Habersham County, No. 2:04-CV-211 -RWS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23332, at *47-53 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 8, 2006) (finding that the plaintiff failed to show that the
employer's nondiscriminatory reason for terminating the plaintiff-insubordination-was a
pretext for unlawful retaliation); see also O'Brien, supra note 44, at 748 (describing the burden-
shifting dance in retaliation claims).
49. See Phelan v. Cook County, 463 F.3d 773, 788 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that the
plaintiff introduced evidence that her termination was inconsistent with her satisfactory job
performance shortly before termination).
50. See id. (noting that the record was full of evidence of warnings by supervisors that
Phelan would be reprimanded if she continued to make complaints).
51. See id. (noting that a jury could conclude that the time between the plaintiff's
protected activity and her termination proved a causal connection).
52. See O'Brien, supra note 44, at 749 ("[P]erhaps the most important and most common
circumstantial evidence of a causal connection is temporal proximity.").
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plaintiff.53 Courts generally agree that although temporal proximity may not be
per se sufficient to show a causal connection, it can be and is significant in
showing the third element of retaliation.54 Courts have not agreed, however, on
the necessary amount of time needed to constitute sufficient temporal proximity
to show causation.55
Even though a plaintiff who argues for a cognizable retaliation action
despite reinstatement with back pay differs situationally from a plaintiff who
claims "normal retaliation," the two types of plaintiffs nonetheless bear the
same burden of proving the first and third elements of the retaliation claim.
The plaintiffs must show a statutorily protected expression and a causal
relationship between that expression and the adverse action. Where the two
plaintiffs differ is in the second element-proof of an adverse action.
B. Second Element as the Difference Maker: Has the Plaintiff Suffered an
Adverse Action?
1. Burlington Northern and a New Outlook on the Meaning Behind
"Materially Adverse" Employment Actions
A defendant-employer likely will argue that a plaintiff does not have a
cause of action, basing its argument on the purported lack of any adverse
employment action.56 The second element of a Title VII retaliation claim seeks
proof that the plaintiff suffered a materially adverse action.57 Title VII forbids
an employer from "discriminat[ing] against" an employee because the latter
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in a Title VII proceeding;
58
however, the statute does not define the phrase "discriminate against."59
Consequently, courts have created the judicial threshold of "materially adverse
53. See id. (stating the rationale behind the inference of temporal proximity).
54. See id. (citing different court interpretations of temporal proximity).
55. See id. ("Additionally, although no jurisdiction has adopted a bright line test for
determining the amount of time that is probative of a causal connection, courts recognize that a
very short interval between protected activity and adverse action is highly probative of a causal
connection.").
56. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2417 (2006)
("Second, Burlington argues that the 37-day suspension without pay lacked statutory
significance because Burlington ultimately reinstated White with backpay.").
57. See Eiland v. Trinity Hosp., 150 F.3d 747, 753 (7th Cir. 1998) (describing the
elements of a prima facie case for employment retaliation).




action" or "tangible employment action" to define Title VII's "discriminate
against" clause.60 By adopting this threshold, courts hope to prevent employees
from bringing frivolous claims.6' The Sixth Circuit commented on the need for
this standard: "If every low evaluation or other action by an employer that
makes an employee unhappy or resentful were considered an adverse action,
Title VII would be triggered by supervisor criticism or even facial expressions
indicating displeasures.
62
Even with this judicial threshold of "materially adverse" for Title VII
claims, prior to Burlington Northern,63 the circuits disagreed over the definition
of "materially adverse action." 64 In Burlington Northern, Burlington hired
Sheila White as a track laborer but assigned her to operate a forklift instead
when she arrived. 65 After experiencing alleged sexual harassment from her
supervisor, White complained to Burlington officials.66 That same day,
Burlington reassigned her to standard track laborer tasks.67 White then filed a
complaint with the EEOC.68 Burlington suspended White for insubordination,
but following a hearing, Burlington reinstated White with back pay.69
Despite being reinstated with back pay, White brought a retaliation suit
against Burlington.70 Justice Breyer recognized the issue before the Court:
The Courts of Appeals have come to different conclusions about the scope
of [the Civil Rights Act's] anti-retaliation provision, particularly the reach
of its phrase "discriminate against." Does that provision confine actionable
retaliation to activity that affects the terms and conditions of employment?
And how harmful must the adverse actions be to fall within its scope?
7'
60. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,761 (1998) (citing cases requiring
a "tangible employment action" to satisfy a Title VII claim).
61. See Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456,462 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that
employment actions that are de minimus are not actionable under Title VII).
62. Primes v. Reno, 190 F.3d 765, 767 (6th Cir. 1999).
63. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2417-18 (2006)
(finding that the plaintiff was materially and adversely harmed by the employer's retaliatory
actions).
64. See id at 2410-11 (citing previous case law's definition of"discriminate against").






71. Id. at 2408.
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To solve this split, the Supreme Court adopted a reasonable person standard to
determine whether a wrongly terminated employee suffered a materially
adverse action.72 Specifically, a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee
would have found the challenged action to be materially adverse, meaning that
it "might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
charge of-discrimination. 7 3 Applying this standard, the Supreme Court held
that Burlington's thirty-seven day suspension of White, even though Burlington
74reinstated her with back pay, constituted retaliation. The Court noted that a
reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would consider the reassignment
and the suspension to be materially adverse.75
The Court acknowledged that certain circuits required a close relationship
between the retaliatory action and employment-that the disputed employment
action must adversely change the terms and conditions of the employment.76
Other circuits adopted an even more restrictive approach, requiring an "ultimate
employment decision," such as termination or denying leave.77 However, the
Court opted for the standard adopted by the Seventh and D.C. Circuits: The
plaintiff must show that the "'employer's challenged action would have been
material to a reasonable employee"' in that it would "'dissuade a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.,"
78
In reaching its decision, the Burlington Northern Court first compared the
language in the anti-discrimination provision with the anti-retaliation provision
of the Civil Rights Act; it concluded that Congress did not intend to limit the
anti-retaliation provision to effects on the terms or conditions of employment.79
72. See id. at 2409 (concluding that the anti-retaliation provision does not confine the
action and harms it forbids to those related to the employment and that an action must be
materially adverse to a reasonable employee).
73. Id. at 2415 (citation omitted).
74. Id. at2416.
75. Id. at2417.
76. See id. at 2410 (describing the test used in the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits).
77. See id. (describing the test used in the Fifth and Eighth Circuits).
78. Id. at 2411, 2415 (citations omitted).
79. See id. at 2411-12 (noting the linguistic differences between the anti-discrimination
and anti-retaliation provisions). The Court stated:
The underscored words in the [anti-discrimination] provision-"hire," "discharge,"
"compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," "employment
opportunities," and "status as an employee"--explicitly limit the scope of that
provision to actions that affect employment or alter the conditions of the workplace.
No such limiting words appear in the anti-retaliation provision.
Id.; see also id. at 2412 (concluding that Congress likely intended to differentiate between the
anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation provisions of the Civil Rights Act because the former
seeks to prevent injury to individuals based on their status while the latter seeks to prevent
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The more expansive standard adopted by the Court allows the plaintiff to lay
out the elements of a prima facie case broadly, because she may include both
retaliation within and outside the scope of employment. Although the Court
did not address the public policy behind this decision, the policy rationale is
self-evident. A restrictive definition would produce unusual results. An
employer could retaliate in nonemployment contexts but would be barred from
retaliating within the scope of employment. For example, an employer could
threaten the employee with bodily harm, which would not involve a material
change in the terms and conditions of employment, but an employer could not
retaliate by cutting the employee's wages, even though the former is arguably
more retaliatory than the latter.
Second, the Court noted that the adverse action must be material.8° Justice
Breyer expounded on the meaning of materially adverse action by incorporating
an objective standard.8' The Court adopted this standard because it is
"judicially administrable ... [and] avoids the uncertainties and unfair
discrepancies that can plague a judicial effort to determine a plaintiff's unusual
subjective feelings. 8 2 The context of the employment and the nature of the
challenged action are integral in utilizing the objective standard.83 For
example, a change in an employee's work schedule may not be materially
adverse for most employees, but for a single mother with young children this
would be an adverse action. 4
Applying the objective standard, the Burlington Northern Court found no
merit in the employer's claim that "'it defies reason to believe that Congress
would have considered a rescinded investigatory suspension with full back pay'
to be unlawful. '85  Burlington's behavior caused emotional harm that
reinstatement and back pay alone could not remedy because White and her
family had to live thirty-seven days without knowing if she would return to
work.86 A reasonable person in White's situation would be deterred from
injury to individuals based on their conduct).
80. See id. at 2415 ("We speak of material adversity because we believe it is important to
separate significant from trivial harms.").
81. See id. (adopting the reasonable employee standard).
82. Id.
83. See id. (noting the importance of context in anti-retaliation cases).
84. See id. (citing the example in Washington v. Illinois Department ofRevenue, 420 F.3d
658 (7th Cir. 2005), of a working mother being materially and adversely affected by a change in
her work schedule). Tailoring this "reasonable person," however, turns an objective standard
into a subjective one.
85. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2417 (2006) (citations
omitted).
86. See id. at 2417 (describing the plaintiff's emotional injuries).
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challenging workplace discrimination if an employer acted like the employer in
Burlington Northern.87 Under this scenario, one can hardly imagine how such
employer action could be construed as anything but materially adverse.
A potential risk with the materially adverse standard still remains. Instead
of analyzing each fact scenario, lower courts may look at previous decisions
and automatically adopt the earlier, narrow holdings. For example, the
Burlington Northern decision that a thirty-seven day suspension followed by
reinstatement with back pay has been interpreted by some lower courts to mean
that reinstatement with back pay always constitutes a materially adverse
88employment action. Courts must refrain from turning the Burlington
Northern flexible "circumstances" test into a rigid rule. While a wrongly
terminated employee who is later reinstated with back pay is not precluded
from filing a cause of action, a court should still use the Burlington Northern
materially adverse test to determine if the plaintiff in question has a cause of
action.
2. The State of Current Law Pertaining to the Preclusion of an Employee's
Retaliation Claim
In Burlington Northern, the Court suggested but did not hold that a
wrongly terminated employee has a cognizable cause of action if the employer
reinstates the employee with back pay prior to the initiation of the lawsuit. The
Burlington Northern Court did not, however, specifically address this issue.
Rather, the Court's purpose was to resolve the circuit split on the meaning of
"materially adverse." 89
In a factually similar case to Burlington Northern, the Seventh Circuit in
Phelan v. Cook County9 0 posed the issue at hand: "[W]hether the fact that [the
employer] later reinstated [the employee] and awarded her back pay somehow
87. See id. ("Many reasonable employees would find a month without a paycheck to be a
serious hardship.... [and] an indefinite suspension without pay could well act as a deterrent,
even if the suspended employee eventually received backpay.").
88. See, e.g., Randolph v. Ohio Dep't of Youth Servs., 453 F.3d 724, 737 (6th Cir. 2006)
(concluding that because the employer terminated the plaintiff and reinstated her with 70% back
pay, this was analogous to the plaintiff in Burlington Northern such that the case at issue
involved a materially adverse action).
89. See Burlington N, 126 S. Ct. at 1210-11 (discussing the circuit split on the meaning
behind "discriminate against" and "materially adverse," and granting certiorari to resolve the
issue).
90. Phelan v. Cook County, 463 F.3d 773, 788 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that a reasonable




negates her right to pursue her Title VII claims." 91 The plaintiff there was
Laura Phelan, a mechanical assistant in the boiler room of Cook County
Hospital.92  Phelan complained to her supervisor and met with Human
Resources about sexual and racial harassment while at work.9 3 The hospital
gave her two options: reassignment as a medical assistant or termination.94 She
opted for the reassignment but continued to be harassed.95 Phelan missed
months of work due to the emotional distress, and Cook County terminated her
employment "due to the absences. 9 6 Following the fifty-eight day termination,
Cook County reinvestigated and reinstated the plaintiff with back pay.97 The
Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment that
Phelan was not subject to adverse employment action. 98 The circuit court
concluded that a reinstatement with back pay after lengthy suspension does not
bar a Title VII claim in light of the recent Burlington Northern decision and
because of public policy reasons. 99
The court determined that Phelan's reinstatement with back pay did not
preclude her from bringing a cause of action under Title VII because the
adverse action requirement sought to provide a reasonable limit for the types of
actionable conduct.100 Recognizing the Supreme Court's Burlington Northern
decision earlier that year that suspension without pay (even with reinstatement
and back pay) was an adverse action, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
reinstatement after actual termination surely must be materially adverse. 1 1
91. Id. at 780.
92. Id. at 776.
93. Id. at 776-77.
94. Id. at 777.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 777-78.
97. Id. at 778.
98. Id. at 776.
99. See id. at 780-81 ("[W]e decline to endorse a rule that would allow employers to
escape liability by merely reinstating the aggrieved employee months after termination,
whenever it becomes clear that the employee intends to pursue her claims in court."). The
Seventh Circuit went on to say, "Such a rule could create an unintended economic incentive for
employers to reinstate an employee who files a discrimination suit as means to avoid Title VII
penalties whenever the costs of reinstating the employee are lower than the employer's exposure
[to] suit." Id. at 780.
100. See id. at 780-81 ("We believe that [reinstatement with back pay does not negate the
right to pursue Title VII claims], since the only purpose of the adverse employment action
requirement is to provide a reasonable limiting principle for the type of conduct actionable
under the statute.").
101. See id. at 781 ("If a suspension that ends in reinstatement and reimbursement can
constitute an adverse employment action, it follows that reinstatement and reimbursement do
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Regardless of the reinstatement with back pay, Phelan's four-month termination
"measurably injured" her both financially and emotionally.10 2 Phelan presented
evidence of gender-related comments and assaults by co-workers, and the
"suspicious timing" of her termination after her complaint was sufficient
evidence for a reasonable person to believe the action was materially adverse.1
0 3
Other courts, however, have concluded that reinstatement negates any
adverse employment, thereby precluding the plaintiff from initiating a
retaliation claim.1 4 In Lumhoo v. Home Depot USA, Inc.,0 5 the district court
held that Home Depot did not engage in an adverse employment action because
it reinstated the plaintiff following an investigation into his termination.1
0 6
Home Depot hired the plaintiffs, both minorities, as order pullers and truck
drivers. 10 7 The head of the lumber department, Duffy, yelled at them, alleging
that damage had been done to the lumber, and wrongly accused one of the
plaintiffs of failing to wear a seatbelt on the forklift. 0 8 Duffy then proceeded to
call the plaintiffs racially derogatory names.'0 9 The plaintiffs spoke with
another supervisor about the incident, and that supervisor later obtained
permission from the manager of the store to fire one of the plaintiffs.1 °
Following an investigation, Home Depot reinstated the terminated plaintiff and
offered "full back pay, the same salary and benefits, and the same seniority
status.""'
not bar a finding of adverse employment action where there was an actual termination, which is
a more serious action than suspension.").
102. See id. (concluding that the plaintiff's prolonged termination harmed her adversely).
103. See id. at 781-82 (describing the plaintiff's evidence of material adverse action).
104. See, e.g., Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1267 (1 1th Cir. 2001)
(describing the precedent of precluding a retaliation cause of action if an employer already
reinstated the employee with back pay). The court noted:
The caselaw in this area indicates that the decision to reprimand or transfer an
employee, if rescinded before the employee suffers a tangible harm, is not an
adverse employment action. But when an employee loses pay or an employment
benefit from a delayed promotion, courts have held that the employment action is
not adverse only when the action is rescinded and backpay is awarded.
Id.
105. See Lumhoo v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d 121, 144 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
(rejecting the plaintiff's retaliation claim).
106. See id. at 144 ("Plaintiffs have failed to allege an adverse employment action
sufficient to a make out a prima facie case of retaliation.").
107. Id. at 127.
108. Id. at 128.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 129.
111. Id. at 139 (explaining how the plaintiffs failed to establish a materially adverse
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For the plaintiffs' discrimination and retaliation claims, the district court
held that the wrongly terminated plaintiff's reinstatement negated any adverse
employment action. 1 2 The court called the plaintiff's termination a "mediate
action that was ultimately reversed by [the plaintiff's] reinstatement."' 13 Home
Depot also removed any reference to the termination from the plaintiff's file;
1 14
thus, the plaintiff would not suffer any future harm.
Similarly, in Dobbs-Weinstein v. Vanderbilt University,"5 the Sixth
Circuit concluded that the employer-university did not take a materially adverse
action when the dean refused to grant tenure to the plaintiff-professor. 16 The
court first noted that tenure decisions in the academic context differed from the
normal employment context." 7 Tenure decisions are particularly complex,
such that there are usually grievance procedures to appeal intermediate
decisions. 18 Because of these procedures, the court held that the dean's
decision did not constitute an adverse employment action; his say was not final
and therefore was not an "ultimate" employment decision." 9 If the court
allowed the plaintiffs claim, such a holding would encourage litigation.
1 20
Finally, the Sixth Circuit did not find the plaintiff's claim for emotional and
professional reputation damages convincing; rather, the court noted that the
claim was too speculative to be a judicially recognizable cause of action."'
The Lumhoo and Dobbs-Weinstein courts, therefore, concluded that
reinstatement with back pay precludes a plaintiff's cause of action, because the
plaintiff cannot sufficiently prove the second prong of the retaliation claim-a
materially adverse action. On the other hand, Phelan clearly suggests that
employment action).
112. Id. at 140,144.
113. Id. at 139.
114. See id. (giving further evidence of Home Depot's remedy of the termination).
115. See Dobbs-Weinstein v. Vanderbilt Univ., 185 F.3d 542,546 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding
that the plaintiff, an associate professor at Vanderbilt University, did not have a cause of action
for retaliation because the university eventually did grant the plaintiff tenure and back pay).
116. See id. at 546 ("[The plaintiff] has not here suffered a final or lasting adverse
employment action sufficient to create a prima facie case of employment discrimination under
Title VII.").
117. See id. at 545 (citing case law differentiating tenure and employment settings).
118. See id. (explaining the differences in the tenure system).
119. See id. (finding that the dean's decision was not an "ultimate employment decision").
120. See id. at 546 ("To rule otherwise would be to encourage litigation before the
employer has an opportunity to correct through internal grievance procedures any wrong it may
have committed.").
121. See id. at 545 n.3 (rejecting the plaintiff's claim for emotional and professional
reputational harm).
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certain disputable adverse action exists. Although Burlington Northern does
not specifically address the issue, Burlington Northern's definition of
"materially adverse" and its similar fact scenario to Phelan significantly
contribute to the finding of a retaliation claim.
3. Is Phelan the Right Decision?
With the differing views on whether a reinstated employee has a legal
action, hinging on whether the reinstatement with back pay fully compensates
the employee, a proper analysis must examine: (1) other sources of injuries that
reinstatement and back pay do not address, thus constituting a materially
adverse action; and (2) public policy concerns. An employer likely will argue
that a cognizable cause of action does not exist because the employer has
restored the plaintiff-employee's original position by virtue of reinstatement
and back pay, and, thus, the plaintiff has not suffered any adverse harm.' 22 Is
this, however, an accurate depiction? Is the employee materially and adversely
affected even if she receives reinstatement and back pay?
As noted in Burlington Northern, the employer's argument ignores the
noneconomic harms of suspension or termination, even if there is subsequent
reinstatement with back pay. In Burlington Northern, the Court described the
plaintiff and her family's emotional harm:
White and her family had to live for 37 days without income. They did not
know during that time whether or when White could return to work. Many
reasonable employees would find a month without a paycheck to be a
serious hardship. And White described to the jury the physical and
emotional hardship that 37 days of having "no income, no money" in fact
caused. Indeed, she obtained medical treatment for her emotional
distress. 1
23
Without job certainty, an employee is likely to suffer from emotional pains,
which the Supreme Court viewed as sufficient for finding a materially adverse
action. Further, the 1991 Amendments to the Civil Rights Acts specifically
provide for damages for emotional harms, allowing compensatory damages
awards for: "future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience,
122. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2417 (2006)
("Burlington argues that the 37-day suspension without pay lacked statutory significance




mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses."'
124
The statute thus recognizes noneconomic harms.
In other contexts, courts have held that monetary remedies are not
sufficient to compensate for emotional injuries. In Campbell v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,25 the Utah Court of Appeals concluded that
even if a defendant insurance company eventually pays a claim in full against
the insured, it does not necessarily foreclose the insured from bringing a bad
faith suit. 126 The court rejected the insurance company's assertion that, because
the insured plaintiffs did not suffer any economic harm (following the
insurance company's payment of a claim), the plaintiffs did not have an
actionable bad faith suit. 127 Specifically, the court noted that the economic
damages were not the only cognizable damages.128 The court concluded:
"Eventual payment of the excess judgment does not compensate the insured for
emotional injury, damages to the insured's reputation and credit rating, any
punitive damages awarded against the insured, or any other legally cognizable
injury .... Nor does it 'cure' the insurer's earlier wrongful conduct."1
29
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(2000).
125. See Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 840 P.2d 130, 139 (Utah Ct. App.
1992) (holding that an insurer's payment of an excess judgment does not negate a plaintiff's suit
for a breach of the duty of good faith), rev'd on other grounds, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). In
Campbell, the Campbells tried to pass six cars on a two-lane highway and caused an accident.
Id. at 132. The injured parties initially sued the Campbells-the latter being insured by State
Farm. Id. For three years following the plaintiffs' judgment, State Farm refused to pay more
than its policy limits, an amount that was significantly lower than the judgment. Id. at 135. The
plaintiffs and the Campbells then initiated a bad faith suit against State Farm. Id. The court
dismissed the suits when State Farm paid the excess judgments following an appellate court's
decision to affirm the plaintiffs' first judgment. Id. The Campbells, however, still decided to
initiate the present bad faith action against State Farm. Id. State Farm argued, and the trial
court agreed, that the court should grant summary judgment because it already paid the entire
judgment against the Campbells such that the Campbells were never subject to any liability, i.e.,
the Campbells were not economically harmed. Id. at 136. The Court of Appeals of Utah
reversed the decision and held that State Farm's eventual payment of the excess judgment and
the lack of any economic harm to the Campbells did not foreclose the Campbells' bad faith suit.
Id. at 139. The court noted that the Campbells suffered nonpecuniary damages, including injury
to reputation, credit rating, and emotional distress. Id.
126. See id. at 139 ("[W]e conclude ... that an insurer's eventual payment of an excess
judgment does not necessarily vitiate the insured's cause of action for breach of the duty of
good faith.").
127. See id. (concluding that the insurance company's payment of excess judgment against
the plaintiff did not foreclose the plaintiffs' current bad faith suit against the insurance
company).
128. See id. (setting forth the plaintiffs' potential injuries).
129. Id. at 140.
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The Campbell court listed "damages to... reputation" in addition to
emotional damages as types of nonpecuniary injuries; 130 similarly, there may be
a negative connotation and stigma related to a suspension or termination.
Depending on the specific type of employment, the reputational harm from a
suspension or termination may be exacerbated. For example, in the medical
context, a reinstated doctor may lose patients who worry or believe the doctor's
suspension/termination was warranted.
In Lumhoo, the employer specifically recognized this potential "stigma
harm" and sought to remedy it by erasing all records of the termination.
131
Although the court in Lumhoo did not accept this stigma argument, finding
instead that the employer fully remedied the situation, it applied a rule for
materially adverse employment action that was ultimately narrower than the
Supreme Court's Burlington Northern standard. In order to show adverse
action, the Lumhoo court required the plaintiff to show that the action "created
a materially significant disadvantage.' 32 According to the court, this had to
relate to the employment. 33 The court juxtaposed the general employment
discrimination statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, which includes this language of
adverse action relating to the employment context, into the meaning of the
retaliation statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3, which makes no mention of the
relation to the employment context. 134 The Supreme Court explicitly rejected
mixing the discrimination and the retaliation statutes in the Burlington
Northern decision. 135 Although Lumhoo is still technically good law, if the
court applied the broader definition of' "materially adverse" set forth in
Burlington Northern, the Lumhoo court likely would have found the stigma
harm to be an adverse employment action.
130. See id. (naming potential sources of injuries).
131. See Lumhoo v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d 121, 129 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
("[Employer] reinstated [plaintiff's] employment ... [and] paid [plaintiff] for the three week
period of his termination and removed all documents concerning his termination from Company
records.").
132. Id. at 138 (citations omitted).
133. See id. (adopting the Second Circuit test that the plaintiff suffers an adverse
employment action if she endures a materially adverse change in the terms of the conditions of
employment).
134. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 when discussing the retaliation statute).
135. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe. Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2411-12 (2006)
("The underscored words in the [anti-discrimination] provision-'hire,' 'discharge,'
'compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,' 'employment opportunities,'
and 'status as an employee'-explicitly limit the scope of that provision to [employment]
actions .... No such limiting words appear in the anti-retaliation provision."); see id. at 2412




Furthermore, even if an employer like Home Depot erases all records of
termination, a plaintiff may still have a cause of action for reputational harm; a
plaintiff's co-workers, family members, and the community may still believe
that there was merit behind the suspension/termination. Judge Moore, in her
Dobbs- Weinstein dissenting opinion, 36 wrote, "This court has recognized that
in making a plaintiff whole it often will be appropriate to award prejudgment
interest and damages for emotional harm. Similarly, a successful Title VII
plaintiff should be compensated for reputational damage especially when it
impacts her employment or her future employability and advancement." 
137
Even though the plaintiff cannot argue for traditional economic damages if
she is reinstated with back pay, she may be able to argue that her employer
deprived her of career growth during the period of her suspension/termination.
In other words, she suffered professional losses during the time of her
unemployment. This professional harm argument is closely related to the
reputational harm argument, but the damage is not the same. Judge Moore
describes the reputational damages as creating a stigma that may affect an
employee's future career;1 38 however, the professional development argument
broadens this idea. The professional damage argument asks, "If the plaintiff
had not been suspended, what would the differences between her skills and
research developments be with where she is now?" For example, a chemist
may argue that his one-month suspension set back his research three months
136. Note that the Dobbs-Weinstein court rested its decision largely on the purported
differences between tenure and normal employment contexts. See Dobbs-Weinstein v.
Vanderbilt Univ., 185 F.3d 542, 545 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting the differences between tenure and
normal employment settings). The court reached its conclusion that the plaintiff did not suffer
an adverse action when the dean refused her tenure because she still had an option to appeal the
decision; thus the court did not consider the dean's decision to be ultimate employment action.
Id. at 545-46. Yet the court grossly misinterpreted the tenure versus employment distinction;
even "normal" employers most likely have grievance procedures for appealing a supervisor's
decisions. See Phelan v. Cook County, 463 F.3d 773, 778 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing the
plaintiff's decision to appeal the result of a hearing to terminate the plaintiff); Lumhoo v. Home
Depot USA, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d 121, 129 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)(noting how the Human Resources
Manager reinstated the plaintiff with back pay following the plaintiff's supervisor's decision to
terminate the plaintiff). Even without specific mention of grievance procedures, other courts
have not distinguished between tenured and non-tenured employees. See Rubinstein v. Adm'rs
of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 409 (5th Cir. 2000) (affirming the district court's
ruling that Tulane did retaliate against a tenured professor, although reducing the punitive
damages amount as excessive). In light of the grievance procedures provided by many
employers, the 1991 Civil Rights Act Amendments, and the Burlington Northern decision,
Dobbs- Weinstein likely is questionable as good law.
137. Dobbs-Weinstein v. Vanderbilt Univ., 185 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 1999) (Moore, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
138. See id. (Moore, J., dissenting) (discussing the possibility of professional reputational
harm).
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due to retesting, etc. A boiler-room mechanic who missed a week of training
due to suspension may argue that she lost a month's worth of work because she
could not do the work for lack of training, and her employer could not create a
make-up training session until much later. Applying the Burlington Northern
standard, a reasonable employee may be dissuaded from exercising a statutorily
protected action if she knows that her professional development will take a hit.
In other non-Title VII cases, courts have held that recovery may be
possible for lost future income or professional development potential. 139 In one
such case where an employer demoted an employee, the latter argued that there
was a due process violation and specifically pointed to future income and
professional development potential as sources of property interests. 140 One
federal district court has noted, "A demotion usually comes with an immediate
loss of pay and status, and may result in a loss of future income and
professional development potential."' 4 1  Similarly, a wrongly terminated
plaintiff later reinstated can argue that courts have recognized the existence of
professional development losses as a cognizable interest and harm. Even
though a reinstated employee does not suffer any tangible economic injury, she
can still single out emotional damages and lost future wages. Because the
reinstatement with back pay does not fully compensate for these injuries, a
Phelan-type answer, allowing the plaintiff to pursue a cause of action, is
probably correct.
Finally, a reinstated plaintiff with back pay can also make a public policy
argument. Public policy is contravened if an employer could discriminate/
retaliate against an employee and then avoid a lawsuit simply by reinstating the
employee with back pay. The Phelan court noted:
[A] rule that prevented the finding of an adverse employment action where
the terminating or suspending employer later reinstated the employee would
"allow[] an employer unilaterally to cut off the employee's claims for other
damages, which have been explicitly authorized by Title VII since the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, such as interest on the back pay, attorney's fees,
emotional suffering, and punitive damages."
42
139. See e.g., Evans v. Morgan, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1104 (W.D. Wis. 2003) (finding
that the loss in future earnings and professional development constitutes a deprivation of a
property interest).
140. See id. at 1103-04 (describing the facts of the case and finding a sufficient property
interest); see also Greenlee v. Bd. of Med., 813 F. Supp. 48, 54-55 (D.D.C. 1993) (recognizing
the plaintiff's attempt to seek damages for lost wages and professional development losses, but
rejecting the claim because the medical board had rational reasons to deny the plaintiff's
application for a medical license).
141. Evans, 304 F. Supp. 2d at 1103.
142. Phelan v. Cook County, 463 F.3d 773, 781 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
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If the court allowed the employer to bypass liability by precluding the employee
from initiating a lawsuit, the result would conflict with the goals of the Civil
Rights Act of making an employee whole and deterring employers from
discriminating. 143 Public policy alone justifies a court to reach a Phelan
holding, thereby giving an employee the right to sue. Whether the plaintiff uses
a public policy or nonpecuniary harms rationale, however, the plaintiff must
still convince the court that an appropriate remedy exists for her recognized
legal claim.
III. Available Remedies
After the plaintiff passes the hurdle of a prima facie case, the court must
decide what type of remedy is appropriate. A plaintiff, however, should not
confuse the presence of a remedy as an indication that she necessarily has a
cause of action; conversely, a plaintiff does have to show a cognizable claim
before she justifies a particular remedy. 44 Courts generally have broad
discretion to award damages in Title VII cases, 45 but the plaintiff must
demonstrate the necessity for a specific type of remedy. Economically, the
plaintiff has been made whole by the employer so the plaintiff faces an uphill
battle to convince the court to award compensatory damages, yet alone any
other type of damages.
A. Section 1981a Statutorily Available Remedies
One weapon in the plaintiff's arsenal is the Civil Rights Act itself. The
Civil Rights Act reflects Congress's intent to treat employment discrimination
143. See Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 (1989) (recognizing that the chief goals of
the Civil Rights Act are compensation and deterrence).
144. See Dobbs-Weinstein v. Vanderbilt Univ., 185 F.3d 542, 546 (6th Cir. 1999)
(rejecting the plaintiff's argument that her claim for emotional distress and professional
reputation damages means that her claim for retaliation is viable and calling the line of argument
as placing "the cart before the horse").
145. See Berta E. Hernandez, Title VII v. Seniority: The Supreme Court Giveth and the
Supreme Court Taketh Away, 35 AM. U. L. REv 339, 344-45 (1986) (explaining the Court's
discretion in awarding damages in Title VII cases). She states:
The [Civil Rights] Act, consistent with the broad purposes of [T]itle VII, provides
courts with broad powers to fashion adequate remedies for discrimination. It
specifically authorizes courts to award injunctive relief, monetary relief, affirmative
action relief, and attorney's fees. Additionally, the Act permits courts to fashion
any other equitable relief that the court deems appropriate.
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claims differently than the run-of-the-mill civil suit. 146  Before the 1991
amendments, a wrongfully terminated employee like Phelan only had access to
equitable remedies, predominantly back pay. 147 Therefore, prior to the 1991
amendments, being already reinstated with back pay, Phelan would not have a
remedy. In 1991, Congress expanded Title VII by adding an amendment to the
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 198 1.148 The current Act provides for a wide
range of remedies, including compensatory and punitive damages (limited to
statutory caps), for a plaintiff who succeeds on an anti-retaliation claim:
In an action brought by a complaining party under... the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional
discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful because of its
disparate impact) prohibited under section ... 704 [anti-retaliation] ... the
complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as
allowed in subsection (b), in addition to any relief authorized by section
706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [enforcement provisions], from the
respondent.
149
The statutory language, "against a respondent who engaged in unlawful
intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful because
of disparate impact)," suggests that a plaintiff must show some kind of
intentional discriminatory action by the employer to have a right to a remedy
under the Civil Rights Act.
The problem, however, is the ambiguity and lack of specificity of remedies
in the Civil Rights Act. 50 May a court award a type of remedy that is not
146. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 258 (3d ed. 2005) (reflecting on
Congress's intent in enacting the Civil Rights Act). They state:
The remedial provisions of Title VII... reflect congressional intent that
employment discrimination disputes should not be handled like other civil disputes.
On the one hand, the statute[] encourage[s] a victim of employment discrimination
to pursue claims like a "private attorney general" to vindicate the public interest in
eradicating discrimination. On the other hand, the statute[] provide[s] limited
judicial remedies.., but have since been expanded ....
Id.
147. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 533 (1999) (referencing the limited
remedies in the pre-1991 Civil Rights Act).
148. See RoTHsTEIN ET AL., supra note 146, at 258-59 (describing the evolution of Title
VII remedies and noting that Congress added an amendment expanding remedies via 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 with specific reference to Title VII).
149. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000).
150. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 2000e-5 (granting punitive, compensatory, and equitable
damages to discrimination claims but providing very little insight on the meaning behind the
three types of damages).
1686
"YOU'RE FIRED!"
expressly included or precluded in the Civil Rights Act? Without specific types
of remedial actions, courts may be reluctant to award a novel remedy.
In the First Amendment retaliation context, the Supreme Court in Bush v.
Lucas.51 addressed the issue of whether or not to fashion a remedy when a
federal right has been violated and Congress has provided a less than complete
remedy for the wrong.152 The Supreme Court assumed that the employer
retaliated against the plaintiff and violated his First Amendment rights, 53 and
that the civil service remedies were not as effective as individual damage
remedies to fully compensate the plaintiff. 54 Congress neither expressly
authorized nor expressly precluded the creation of the remedy the plaintiff
sought-namely punitive damages, emotional and dignitary harms, and
attorney's fees.' 55 Grounding its decision on the history of civil service
remedies and on the comprehensive and elaborate administrative system for
appeals in the civil service context, the Court rejected the plaintiff's argument
for a full and complete nonstatutorily based remedy. 56 The Court noted that
Congress provided a carefully crafted step-by-step procedure for disputes in the
civil service such that the Court should not disrupt the system. ' 57 Further, the
Court stated that Congress was in a better position than the judiciary to change
the available remedies.
158
Similar to the First Amendment situation, the employer facing a retaliation
claim may argue that a court should be cautious in reading into the text of the
Civil Rights Act and fashioning new remedies that are neither explicitly
mentioned nor precluded. Although there are many factual parallels between
the Bush First Amendment employment retaliation case and a Phelan
discriminatory employment retaliation case, the history and the statutes
governing each case is very distinct. The civil service regulations govern a
narrow group of people,' 59 whereas the Civil Rights Act governs the vast
majority of employers. 160 The former give a detailed process of appeals and
151. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1983) (refusing to create a new judicial
remedy when the statute was silent).
152. Id. at 372-73.
153. Id. at 372.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 373.
156. Id. at 388-90.
157. Id. at390-91.
158. Id. at 389.
159. Id. at 382-85.
160. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2000) (defining employers subjected to the requirements of
Title VII).
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procedures to ensure that a plaintiff has several options to petition for review of
an adverse decision.161 In enacting the civil service statutes, Congress carefully
thought through various avenues for full compensation; there is thus a better
argument that Congress alone should fashion any new remedies. 62 On the
other hand, the Civil Rights Act gives broad discretion to courts to rectify
discriminatory retaliation because Congress recognized that the purpose behind
the statute was twofold: (1) to compensate the plaintiff and (2) to deter
discriminatory conduct. 163 Specifically, the phrase "other equitable relief' in
Section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act states Congress's intent "'to give the
courts wide discretion exercising their equitable powers to fashion the most
complete relief possible."1 64 A court, therefore, should not reject a type of
remedy simply because the remedy is not specifically mentioned in the Civil
Rights Act. However, a court must be cautious and balance the goals of the
Civil Rights Act to deter and compensate with the potential danger that
awarding damages may encourage unnecessary litigation.1
65
1. Punitive Damages
One category of damages the Civil Rights Act explicitly recognizes is
punitive damages.1 66 The 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act loosely
define punitive and compensatory damages. 167 The statute allows for punitive
161. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367,387-88 (1983) (reviewing the civil service appeals
process).
162. See id at 381-88 (discussing the legislative history of the civil service statutes and
regulations).
163. See Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 (1989) (recognizing that the chief goals of
the Civil Rights Act are compensation and deterrence).
164. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747,764 (1976) (citations omitted); see also
Douglas M. Staudmeister, Grasping the Intangible: A Guide to Assessing Nonpecuniary
Damages in the EEOC Administrative Process, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 189, 198-99 (1996)
(describing the inadequacy of the .Civil Rights Act pre-1991). He states:
Congressional supporters also recognized the inadequacy of the remedial scheme
under Title VII.... [N]o matter how egregious the discrimination, victims were
[prior to the 1991 Amendments] unable to recover compensatory damages despite
the emotional suffering, physical pain, and related medical expenses that can
accompany such stigmatizing treatment.
Id.
165. See Staudmeister, supra note 164, at 200-02 (discussing the arguments against
awarding compensatory damages and recognizing the reality of increased EEOC claims
following the passage of the 1991 amendments).
166. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000) (naming punitive damages as a type of remedy).
167. See id (noting the conditions plaintiff must show for punitive damages, listing
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damages if "the complaining party demonstrates that the respondent engaged in
a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with
reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved
individual."'
68
The plaintiff should note, however, that the fact-finder will consider the
statutory caps in determining the actual amount of the punitive damage
award.1 69 The EEOC and courts thus agree that, in general, Title VII punitive
damages should rarely be exorbitant. 170 Additionally, there may also be due
process limits on punitive damages.' 7' Regardless of these potential
constraints, a plaintiff may recover punitive damages if she can show that the
employer maliciously or recklessly discriminated against her by a
preponderance of the evidence.1
72
Although a discrimination case (rather than an anti-retaliation case), in
Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 173 the Supreme Court elucidated on
employment discrimination-based punitive damages. 74 In Kolstad, the Court
compensatory damage exclusions, and setting limits for punitive and compensatory damage
recovery).
168. Id. Additionally, there is some argument that an employee bringing a discrimination
charge may recover punitive damages without recovering any compensatory damages. See
generally Christy Lynn McQuality, Note, No Harm, No Foul?: An Argument for the Allowance
of Punitive Damages Without Compensatory Damages Under 42 U.S. C. § 1981a, 59 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 643 (2002).
169. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (outlining the compensatory and punitive damages cap
depending on the size of the employer).
170. See EEOC v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 256 F.3d 516, 528 (7th Cir. 2001) (discussing the
court's ability and obligation to keep the trial within "sensible bounds" in determining punitive
damages).
171. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433 (2001)
("Despite the broad discretion that States possess with respect to the imposition of criminal
penalties and punitive damages, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution imposes substantive limits on that discretion."); see also State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003) ("The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments
on a tortfeasor.").
172. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 a (2000) ("A complaining party may recover punitive damages
under this section against a respondent... if the complaining party demonstrates that the
respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with
reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual."); see also
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 253 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("Conventional
rules of civil litigation generally apply in Title VII cases, and one of these rules is that parties to
civil litigation need only prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence.").
173. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 534-35 (1999) (holding that
egregious conduct is not necessary to meet the requirements for punitive damages).
174. See id. at 534-35 (holding that an employer's conduct does not necessarily need to be
egregious to entitle a plaintiff to punitive damages under the Civil Rights Act).
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determined that a plaintiff does not need to show that an employer committed a
particularly egregious discriminatory act in order to receive jury instructions for
punitive damages. In its analysis, the majority acknowledged that the wording
for punitive damages in the Civil Rights Act-"discriminatory practices with
malice or reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved
individual"-suggested a two-tiered standard of liability. 75  The Court,
however, rejected the conclusion that a plaintiff must show egregious behavior
by the employer in order to receive jury instructions for punitive damages. 1
76
Because the terms "malice" and "reckless indifference" usually refer to a state
of mind, egregious conduct may be evidence of mental state; but, a plaintiff
may show the employer's state of mind without a showing of egregious
conduct.17 7  The Court concluded that an employer must know that it is
violating a federal law, rather than just knowing that it is discriminating, to find
a condition for "malice" or "reckless indifference." 
78
Further, in keeping with Title VII's prophylactic objective, the Kolstad
Court provided limitations on vicarious liability. The Court decided that an
employer will not be liable for punitive damages for the discriminatory acts of
its agents if the employer made a "good-faith effort to comply with Title
VII.,179 To successfully launch a discrimination claim against her employer, a
plaintiff must show that the discriminating agent acted in a managerial capacity
in the scope of her employment.
80
175. See id. at 534 (noting that the congressional intent of the 1991 amendment was to
limit punitive damage awards to a subset of cases involving intentional discrimination, thus
requiring an additional demonstration to make out a claim for punitive damages).
176. See id. at 534-35 (rejecting the approach of the D.C. Circuit).
177. See id. at 535 (discussing the requirement for a particular state of mind).
178. See id. at 536-37 ("There will be circumstances where intentional discrimination does
not give rise to punitive damages liability .... [T]he employer may simply be unaware of the
relevant federal prohibition. There will be cases, moreover, in which the employer
discriminates with the distinct belief that its discrimination is lawful.").
179. See id. at 545 (describing the Court's intent to keep in line with the purpose of Title
VII by departing from the Restatement's scope of employment rules).
180. See id. at 545-46 (discussing the need of the plaintiff to show managerial capacity of
the discriminating agent while acting in the scope of employment); see also Rubinstein v.
Adm'rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392,405 (5th Cir. 2000) (elucidating on the burden
to show a managerial capacity). The court stated:
[T]he employee must satisfy an additional requirement as set out in this recent
articulation of the necessary showing to obtain punitive damages under Title VII:
the requirement of agency. Relevant to this case, the evidence must support a
finding that the malfeasing agent served in a "managerial capacity" and committed
the wrong while "acting in the scope of employment."
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Applying the Kolstad standard for punitive damages to reinstated
employees with back pay, the plaintiff may argue for punitive damages upon a
showing of "malice" or "reckless indifference" by her employer. Although she
does not need to show particularly egregious conduct, such a showing will
support the plaintiffs claim of the requisite employer mental state. 8  In
particular, employers in retaliation cases may have difficulty showing that they
lacked the requisite malicious or reckless mental state. The employer is often
already on notice that it is violating some kind of law or company policy-the
first element of the prima facie case for retaliation is that the employee engaged
in a statutorily protected activity, like filing an EEOC complaint.1 82 Thus,
when the employer learns of the employee's complaint and takes adverse
action, the employer knows that it is violating anti-discriminatory law/policy.
The employer then may not argue that it did not subjectively know that he was
violating a law by retaliating against the employee even if he knew that the
discriminatory acts were prohibited; there is a stronger claim of a "malicious"
or "reckless" mental state for a retaliation claim than for a pure discrimination
allegation. Finally, in order to receive punitive damages from the employer, the
plaintiff must also show that the retaliating managerial agent did not act
contrary to the employer's own efforts to comply with Title VII.I8 3 Even if the
plaintiff cannot prove this extra element of malice or reckless disregard,
however, she may still convince the court to award compensatory damages.
2. Compensatory Damages
Whereas punitive damages seek to deter employers and provide retribution
for plaintiffs, compensatory damages provide redress for a plaintiffs "concrete
loss[es]."'184 A finding of compensatory damages does not require a showing of
a malicious or reckless mental state; however, because the language of the
181. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 535 (1999) (rejecting arequirement
to show egregious conduct while noting its importance in showing the employer's state of
mind).
182. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2000) (prohibiting retaliation for filing, testifying, assisting,
or participating in a discrimination charge); see also Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel,
Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 223 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that the plaintiff meets the first element of the
retaliation claim by filing an EEOC complaint).
183. See Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 545-46 (recognizing that the employer cannot be liable for
the acts of its managers if the managers' discriminatory actions are contrary to the employer's
efforts to comply with Title VII).
184. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,416-17 (2003) (noting
the differences between the purposes of punitive and compensatory damages) (citations
omitted).
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statute includes the parenthetical, "not an employment practice that is unlawful
because of its disparate impact," 1 85 the award of compensatory damages still
requires a finding of intentional discrimination. Unlike the definition of
punitive damages, however, the statute provides more concrete examples of
compensatory damages:
Compensatory damages awarded under this section shall not include
backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of relief authorized under
section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act.... [Compensatory damages may
include damages] for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering,
inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other
nonpecuniary losses ....
The Civil Rights Act also specifically mentions types of damages for
emotional harm (emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental
anguish, loss of enjoyment of life) as forms of compensatory damage. '
8 7
When an employer terminates/suspends an employee, even if the
employer later reinstates the employee with back pay, the employee
suffers emotional harm through the uncertainty of her career. In
Burlington Northern, the Court specifically highlighted the plaintiffs
emotional suffering arising out of the uncertainty of her suspension.1
88
The plaintiff, however, must do more than just testify that she was angry
and upset as a result of the retaliatory actions. 8 9 She should elaborate on
185. 42U.S.C.§ 1981a(a)(l)(2000).
186. Id. § 1981a(b)(2)-(3).
187. See id. § 1981a(b)(3) (establishing limits for compensatory damages, including
damages for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish,
loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses); see also Staudmeister, supra note 164,
at 223-24 (discussing cases where the EEOC awarded damages to compensate for
"embarrassment, humiliation, loss of consortium, and harm to the complainant's marital and
family relationships"). Note, however, that emotional damages are inherently more difficult to
argue than traditional compensatory damages because emotional damages require assigning a
monetary value to intangible pain and suffering. See Staudmeister, supra note 164, at 194
(noting the difficulty of assessing emotional damages).
188. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2417 (2006).
189. See Rubinstein v. Adm'rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 409 (5th Cir.
2000) (describing the failure of the plaintiff's evidence to prove emotional harms). The court
stated:
[T]he only evidence submitted to the jury concerning Rubinstein's emotional state
resulting from the 1997 pay-raise denial is Rubinstein's own testimony that he was
angry and moody as a result of not receiving a raise. However, as this Court has
noted "hurt feelings, anger and frustration are part of life." As no other evidence
was offered to establish the emotional impact of this retaliatory act, [the plaintiff is
not entitled to damages for emotional harm].
Id. (quoting Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 927, 940 (5th Cir. 1996)).
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the actual emotional stress as White did in Burlington Northern,190 or
show that she sought medical treatment for her emotional distress. 19'
The statute also implies that a plaintiff may have a right to damages
for professional development and reputational losses. According to the
1991 amendments, compensatory damages may include damages for
future pecuniary losses and nonpecuniary losses. 192  Although the
majority disagreed, the Dobbs-Weinstein dissent specifically argued:
"This court has recognized that in making a plaintiff whole it often will
be appropriate to award ... [compensation] for reputational damage
especially when it impacts on her employment or her future employability
and advancement."' 93 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit found room in the
Civil Rights Act for lost future earnings damages. 194 Any type of
reputational damage caused by employer discrimination harms a
plaintiffs future earnings capacity.195 First, the court linked lost future
earnings to an injury to professional standing, character, and
reputation. 196 Second, the court noted that the loss of future earnings is
usually a common law tort remedy that requires a showing that "'[the
plaintiff s] injuries have narrowed [her] range of economic opportunities
available."' 197 To accomplish this, "'a plaintiff must show that [the]
injury caused a diminution in [her] ability to earn a living. is198
190. See Burlington N., 126 S. Ct. at 2417 ("White described to the jury the physical and
emotional hardship that 37 days of having 'no income, no money' in fact caused. ('That was the
worst Christmas I had out of my life. No income, no money, and that made all of us feel
bad.... I got very depressed.')") (citations omitted).
191. See id. (noting that the plaintiff obtained medical treatment for her emotional distress);
see also Phelan v. Cook County, 463 F.3d 773, 778 (7th Cir. 2006) (placing importance on the
fact that the plaintiff began seeing a psychiatrist who diagnosed the plaintiff as suffering from
major depression and post-traumatic stress disorder, which caused the plaintiff to seek a medical
leave of absence).
192. See 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a(b)(3) (2000) (listing types of compensatory damages when
discussing the limitation caps).
193. Dobbs-Weinsten v. Vanderbilt Univ., 185 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 1999) (Moore, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
194. See Williams v. Pharmacia, Inc., 137 F.3d 944, 946 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming the
award to a plaintiff with an actionable claim for retaliation to receive front pay and lost future
earnings as damages).
195. See id. at 952-53 (relating the goal of Title VII to make a plaintiff whole with
damages for reputational harm).
196. See id. at 952 (noting the characterization of lost future earnings as an intangible
nonpecuniary loss by analogizing the lost earnings to reputational injuries).
197. Id. (quoting McKnight v. Gen. Motors Corp., 973 F.2d 1366, 1370 (7th Cir. 1992)).
198. Id. (quoting McKnight v. Gen. Motors Corp., 973 F.2d 1366, 1370 (7th Cir. 1992)).
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Using the same line of argument, a plaintiff reinstated with back pay may
be able to convince a court to award lost future earnings due to professional
development or reputational losses. The weakness of this argument, however,
lies in the lack of precedent for awarding professional losses and the difficulty
in showing a tangible loss. The Dobbs- Weinstein majority specifically rejected
the professional development loss argument because of the injury's speculative
nature. 99 The EEOC also has rejected similar loss of opportunity and damage
to career claims in the past.200 To overcome this hurdle, the plaintiff must
argue that due to the termination or suspension, there was a period of time
where she was unable to further her career development.20' Specifically, the
lost time stifled her professional learning such that it narrowed her future job
opportunities. For example, if the plaintiff was a first-year associate in a law
firm, a suspension during training week will not sufficiently be made whole
simply by reinstating the junior associate with back pay alone. If the law firm
only offers this training once a year, the lack of training will limit the types of
tasks that the young lawyer can perform for that year. The suspension, even if
erased from firm records, may also ruin the lawyer's reputation such that no
partner or client is willing to let her participate in matters.
A plaintiff, therefore, can argue for compensatory damages. These
damages will compensate her for emotional, reputational, and professional
development injuries. Whether a plaintiff can convince the court to award
compensatory damages, she may additionally argue for equitable relief.
B. Section 706(g) Remedies and Injunctive Relief
Although the 1991 amendments added the right to receive compensatory
and monetary damages, these amendments did not change the plaintiffs right
to equitable relief under Section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act.20 2 Congress
199. See Dobbs-Weinstein v. Vanderbilt Univ., 185 F.3d 542, 546 (6th Cir. 1999)
(rejecting the plaintiff's claim for emotional and professional reputational harm).
200. See Staudmeister, supra note 164, at 224 (citing the EEOC's rejection of lost
opportunity and damage to career claims because they were "'too speculative' due to the many
variables unrelated to the agency's action that affect the nature of[] opportunities and the course
of [a] career").
201. See id. at 225 (stating that a successful claim for lost opportunity and damage to
career would require "sufficient proof of injury and linkage").
202. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2000) (describing equitable relief under the Civil Rights
Act); see also Sharkey v. Lasmo, 214 F.3d 371, 375-76 (2d Cir. 2000) (concluding that a Title
VII plaintiff may have both compensatory and equitable damages); McQuality, supra note 168,
at 644, 647-50 ("This right to compensatory and punitive damages represents a significant
departure from the remedies previously available under Title VII, which limited recovery to
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originally provided these equitable remedies to promote reconciliation between
employer and employee and to make the employee "whole. ',20 3 Section 706(g)
provides for injunctive and other equitable relief:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the
complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such
unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or
hiring of employees, with or without back pay... , or any other equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate.
20
4
Although an employer who wrongly terminated an employee may partially
self-remedy the employee's harm by reinstating the employee with back pay, an
employee may still be able to make a colorable argument for further equitable
relief. If the specific equitable remedy the plaintiff seeks is not explicitly
mentioned in Section 706(g), the plaintiff does face a Bush-like problem of
convincing the court to award a remedy that is neither expressly included nor
precluded by the statute.20 5 The Bush problem, however, is slightly less
burdensome given the phrase "which may include, but is not limited to"
preceding the list of equitable relief in Section 706(g).
Further, because one purpose of Title VII is to make a plaintiff whole, a
plaintiff may argue that reinstatement with back pay does not put her in the
same position as pre-termination. A plaintiff may, for example, argue for
retroactive seniority. The Supreme Court held that although not necessarily a
matter of course, victims of employment discrimination should receive
retroactive seniority relief.20 6 A court also has discretion to invent some other
type of injunctive relief. Relying on the goal of Title VII to prevent and deter
remedies such as back-pay and an injunction for reinstatement.").
203. McQuality, supra note 168, at 647-48 ("[The Civil Rights Act] marked a tremendous
advance in the area of civil rights, yet facilitating mediation between employers and employees
remained a primary policy objective of Congress. This policy objective, along with the goal of
making victims of employment discrimination 'whole,' fueled the enactment of Title VII.").
204. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2000).
205. See supra Part III.A (discussing the potential difficulty in arguing for a remedy that is
not specifically mentioned in the statute).
206. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 767-68 (1976) (emphasizing the
need for awards of seniority). The Court stated:
A concomitant award of the seniority credit [the plaintiff] presumptively would
have earned but for the wrongful treatment would also seem necessary in the
absence of justification for denying that relief. Without an award of seniority...
[h]e will perpetually remain subordinate to persons who, but for the illegal
discrimination, would have in respect to entitlement to these benefits his inferiors.
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future employer violations, at least one court has fashioned a remedy to enjoin a
discriminating employer from continuing its current application process.20 7
That court ordered the employer to notify all applicants of their right to priority
consideration for certain jobs.
208
In other contexts, a court will decide the appropriateness of the remedy.
For example, in a typical retaliation lawsuit, a court may decide that
reinstatement is not the most appropriate remedy if the terminated employee
and employer have a history of strained relations.20 9 If an employer has a policy
of first suspending, then reinstating with back pay, a court may enjoin the
employer from applying the policy. Using general principles of equity, and not
constrained by the language of the statute, a court may award injunctive and
equitable relief. If a court does not award any monetary or equitable relief,
however, the plaintiff may still break even by convincing the court to grant
nominal damages, attorney's fees, and administrative costs.
C. Nominal Damages, Attorney's Fees, and Administrative Costs
Despite a plaintiff's failure to show the degree of injury necessary for the
award of compensatory, punitive, or equitable damages, a court may still award
nominal damages.210 Nothing, however, requires a court to award nominal
damages. 21' Even if the court awards nominal damages and shows employer
liability, the downsides of nominal damages are: (1) the plaintiff has relatively
little monetary compensation to show for her employer's discriminatory
actions; and (2) because of the small monetary award, the plaintiff s likelihood
of receiving attorney's fees diminishes. The Supreme Court, in contexts
outside of Title VII discrimination and retaliation charges, has held that a
207. See id. at 751 (recalling the district court's final judgment).
208. Id.
209. See Szymanski v. County of Cook, 468 F.3d 1027, 1028 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing
an earlier district court award of front and back pay in lieu of reinstatement due to the
employment relationship where the employee had previously sued her employer ten times).
210. See Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 253 n. 1 (4th Cir. 1983) ("In addition, even if she does
not regain her job, Katz might be entitled to nominal damages and attorney's fees."); see also
Joshi v. Fla. State Univ., 646 F.2d 981, 991 n.33 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[T]he trial court should
consider whether she might be entitled to other relief, if only nominal damages, which would
carry with it attorneys fees.").
211. See Gibbons v. Bair Found., No. 5:04CV2018, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49596, at *5
(N.D. Ohio July 20, 2006) ("The Court holds that federal case law does not support Plaintiffs
contention that a finding of liability requires an award of nominal damages.").
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prevailing party who receives nominal damages does not have a right to receive
attorney's fees.212
Typically, any prevailing party (plaintiff or defendant) may request court
costs under Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.213 These court
costs usually refer to charges incident to the judgment but not from liability.
214
To further elucidate on the nature of court costs, 28 U.S.C. § 1920 gives clear
examples: clerk and marshal fees, court reporter fees for any transcripts
necessary for the use in the case, printing and witness fees, docket fees, and
court-appointed expert and personnel fees.215 The presumption in favor of
granting court fees for the prevailing party also exists in Title VII retaliation
cases.
Prior to an appeal to the Seventh Circuit challenging the district court's
grant of summary judgment to the defendant in Phelan v. Cook County,216 the
clerk awarded the defendant costs for transcripts that were necessarily
obtained.217 Similarly, a Phelan-type plaintiff who has been reinstated with
back pay may request the court to grant certain types of court and
administrative costs. This request, however, is separate and independent from
the request for attorney's fees.
Under the American rule, without express statutory authorization, court
costs do not include attorney's fees and therefore each party must pay its own
212. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992) ("In some circumstances, even a
plaintiff who formally 'prevails' . .. should receive no attorney's fees at all. A plaintiff who
seeks compensatory damages but receives no more than nominal damages is often such a
prevailing party.").
213. See FED. R. Civ. P. 54 (describing the types of judgment costs available to the
prevailing party).
214. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 372 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "court costs").
215. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2000) (describing the types of fees that the clerk may tax).
216. See Phelan v. Cook County, No. 01 C 3638, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14640, at *6
(N.D. I11. July 20, 2005) (mem.) (granting in part the plaintiff's motion challenging the clerk's
award of costs for the defendants). In Phelan, after the district court granted summaryjudginent
to the defendants, the defendants filed a bill of costs in the amount of $10,043.95, which the
clerk granted. Id. at *1. The plaintiff filed a motion arguing that although costs for transcripts
and court reporter fees are usually recoverable, some of the transcripts were not necessarily
obtained by the defendants. Id. at *3. The defendants failed to use the challenged transcripts in
connection with its summary judgment motion. Id. The plaintiffs motion also contested the
calculation of costs for the transcripts, because the transcripts were not supposed to exceed the
regular copy rate established by the Judicial Conference of the United States. Id. at *4-5. The
court agreed that the defendants bore the burden of showing that the transcripts were necessarily
obtained, but the defendants here failed. Id. at *4. Similarly, the clerk taxed costs for the
transcripts at a higher copy rate than allowed by the Judicial Conference. Id. at *5. The court,
therefore, granted the plaintiffs motion in part. Id. at *6.
217. See id. at *6 (granting the plaintiff s motion challenging excessive transcript costs but
denying the plaintiffs motion related to court reporter fees).
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legal fees. 218 Here, however, the Civil Rights Act specifically allows for
attorney's fees: "In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party. . . a reasonable attorney's fee
(including expert fees) as part of the costs. .". 019 Often, the "degree of
success achieved in the lawsuit" is a factor in determining the reasonableness of
attorney's fees.22°
The plaintiff, therefore, may also argue for the court to award these
nominal damages, attorney's fees, and administrative costs in addition to any
compensatory, equitable, or punitive damages. The difficulty for the reinstated
with back pay employee is the showing of economic harm; the employer has
already self-remedied the economic injury through the reinstatement with back
pay. Because of the diminished claim for economic damages, a court may be
reluctant to award monetary or equitable relief out of concern for giving the
plaintiff a windfall. Even if a court does not award compensatory, punitive, or
equitable damages, however, a wrongly terminated employee still may make an
argument for nominal damages and collateral costs.
IV. Conclusion
Despite conflicting case law, a court should not preclude a wrongly
terminated employee from pursuing a legal cause of action simply because her
employer has already reinstated her with back pay. The reinstatement with
back pay does not fully compensate the employee for any professional
development losses or emotional harms. Further, a holding that an employer's
self-remedy through reinstatement with back pay is sufficient provides a
peculiar result that frustrates the goals of the Civil Rights Act. If an employer
can simply avoid legal repercussions by reinstating an employee with back pay,
employers will not be deterred from committing discriminatory acts. The
employer will simply retaliate in order to send a message to the employee to not
make similar discriminatory allegations in the future, but will make sure to
reinstate the employee with back pay before the employee launches a lawsuit.
218. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 602 (2001) ("In the United States, parties are ordinarily required to bear their
own attorney's fees-the prevailing party is not entitled to collect from the loser. Under this
'American Rule,' we follow 'a general practice of not awarding fees to a prevailing party absent
explicit statutory authority."' (citations omitted)).
219. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2000).
220. See White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 805 (6th Cir. 2004)
(affirming the district court's award of 80% of White's attorney's fees because she was the
prevailing party at trial).
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Finally, with a valid cause of action, a court may use a broad range of
statutory and equitable remedies to achieve the Civil Rights Act's goals of
deterrence and compensation to make the plaintiff whole. Punitive damages
and carefully crafted equitable remedies like injunctions achieve the deterrence
goal. Compensatory damages, including professional development losses and
emotional damages, advance the Civil Rights Act's goal to make a harmed
individual whole again. Even without punitive or compensatory damages,
however, the plaintiff may win a moral victory through nominal damages which
still recognize the employer's liability. By holding that an employee may move
forward with a retaliation claim and recognizing the possible remedies, a court
stays true to the goals of the Civil Rights Act-to deter discriminatory conduct
and to make a plaintiff whole.

